AUTHOR: SHRAVYA K R, JAIN ( DEEMED-TO-BE-UNIVERSITY) SCHOOL OF LAW

The emergence of personality rights as a protectable legal interest has generated significant doctrinal uncertainty within Indian jurisprudence. While courts have increasingly acknowledged the commercial value of celebrity identity, the absence of a coherent statutory or theoretical framework has resulted in reliance on existing doctrines such as passing off.¹ This article critically examines Titan Industries Ltd v Ramkumar Jewellers (2012) and argues that the Indian approach remains conceptually underdeveloped. Through comparative engagement with United States and United Kingdom jurisprudence, the paper contends that a shift towards independent doctrinal recognition—grounded in constitutional principles and responsive to digital realities—is necessary.²

Keywords

Personality Rights, Image Rights, Right of Publicity, Passing Off, Celebrity Endorsement, Comparative Law, Privacy, Intellectual Property

The increasing commodification of identity has transformed personality into a legally and economically significant asset.³ Celebrities and public figures routinely monetize their likeness through endorsements and licensing arrangements, thereby necessitating legal mechanisms to prevent unauthorized exploitation.⁴

Indian jurisprudence has responded incrementally to this development, primarily through judicial innovation rather than legislative intervention.⁵ The decision in Titan Industries Ltd v Ramkumar Jewellers represents a critical moment in this trajectory, wherein the Delhi High Court sought to restrain unauthorized commercial use of celebrity identity through the doctrine of passing off.⁶

However, the reliance on passing off raises fundamental concerns regarding doctrinal coherence. Passing off, traditionally concerned with consumer deception, may not adequately capture the broader economic and dignitary interests underlying personality rights.⁷ This article argues that while Titan Industries advances practical protection, it fails to articulate a principled foundation for personality rights as an independent legal category.

The recognition of personality rights in India has developed through a series of judicial pronouncements rather than statutory codification.⁸

In ICC Development (International) Ltd v Arvee Enterprises, the Delhi High Court acknowledged that publicity rights vest in individuals and cannot be commercially appropriated without consent.⁹ Similarly, DM Entertainment Pvt Ltd v Baby Gift House recognized that unauthorized use of a celebrity’s persona constitutes misappropriation of goodwill.¹⁰

Despite these developments, Indian courts have not clearly articulated whether personality rights are proprietary, privacy-based, or merely derivative of trademark law.¹¹ This ambiguity has resulted in doctrinal inconsistency and over-reliance on passing off.

In Titan Industries Ltd v Ramkumar Jewellers, the plaintiff engaged well-known actors as brand ambassadors for its jewellery advertisements, which acquired substantial goodwill.¹² The defendant reproduced and altered these advertisements to promote its own products, thereby creating a misleading impression of endorsement.¹³

The Delhi High Court granted an injunction, holding that such unauthorized use constituted passing off and violated personality rights.¹⁴ The court emphasized that celebrity identity possesses independent commercial value deserving of legal protection.¹⁵

The absence of doctrinal clarity in Indian law necessitates an examination of competing theoretical justifications.

A. Property-Based Theory

Under this approach, personality rights are treated as proprietary interests that can be commercially exploited and transferred.¹⁶ This aligns with U.S. jurisprudence, where the right of publicity is recognized as a form of intellectual property.¹⁷

B. Privacy-Based Theory

Personality rights may also be grounded in privacy, protecting individuals from unauthorized use of their identity.¹⁸ The recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in Puttaswamy strengthens this approach.¹⁹

C. Unjust Enrichment Theory

A third approach focuses on preventing unjust enrichment arising from the exploitation of another’s reputation.²⁰

The Titan Industries judgment implicitly draws from these theories but does not explicitly adopt any, resulting in conceptual ambiguity.

The reliance on passing off as a doctrinal tool raises several concerns.

A. Misrepresentation Requirement

Passing off requires proof of misrepresentation, which may not exist in all cases of personality rights infringement.²¹

B. Under-Inclusive Protection

Certain forms of exploitation—such as digital replication or merchandising—may not involve consumer confusion but still cause economic harm.²²

C. Conceptual Misalignment

Reducing personality rights to trademark-like interests risks ignoring their broader dignitary and autonomy-based dimensions.²³

A. United States

The United States recognizes the right of publicity as an independent legal right.²⁴ In Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court emphasized protection of the economic value of performance.²⁵

Furthermore, doctrines such as the transformative use test (Comedy III Productions v Saderup Inc.) balance publicity rights with freedom of expression.²⁶

B. United Kingdom

The UK relies on passing off, as demonstrated in Irvine v Talksport Ltd.²⁷ However, courts have been cautious not to recognize a general right of publicity, thereby maintaining doctrinal clarity.²⁸

India’s approach resembles the UK model but lacks its structured limitations.

Technological developments have significantly expanded the scope of personality rights disputes.²⁹

Key challenges include:

• AI-generated likeness and deepfakes

• Unauthorized influencer endorsements

• NFT-based commercialization of identity

These developments expose the inadequacy of traditional doctrines such as passing off in addressing modern forms of exploitation.³⁰

Personality rights may be located within the framework of Article 21, particularly following Puttaswamy.³¹ However, such rights must be balanced against freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a).³²

The absence of constitutional reasoning in Titan Industries represents a missed opportunity to develop a more principled framework.

The judgment represents a pragmatic response to commercial misuse of identity but remains doctrinally incomplete.³³

While it strengthens protection against unauthorized exploitation, it fails to articulate a coherent theoretical basis and does not engage with comparative or constitutional perspectives.

A robust framework for personality rights in India requires:

1. Statutory recognition of publicity rights as independent rights.³⁴

2. Doctrinal separation from passing off.

3. Adoption of balancing tests such as transformative use.³⁵

4. Regulation of digital identity exploitation.

5. Integration with constitutional jurisprudence.

Titan Industries Ltd v Ramkumar Jewellers represents a foundational yet transitional moment in Indian image rights jurisprudence.³⁶ While it affirms the commercial value of celebrity identity, it remains constrained by its reliance on passing off.

Future development must move towards a principled, independent framework capable of 

addressing both traditional and emerging challenges in personality rights law.

1. See Titan Indus. Ltd. v. Ramkumar Jewellers, CS (OS) No. 2662/2011 (Del. HC 2012).

2. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy (2d ed.).

3. See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 225 (2005).

4. Id.

5. See Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (2016).

6. Titan Indus., supra note 1.

7. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (2006).

8. See generally ICC Dev. (Int’l) Ltd. v. Arvee Enters., 2003 (26) PTC 245 (Del).

9. Id.

10. DM Entm’t Pvt. Ltd. v. Baby Gift House, 2010 (42) PTC 520 (Del).

11. Merges et al., supra note 5.

12. Titan Indus., supra note 1.

13. Id.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. McCarthy, supra note 2.

17. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).

18. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).

19. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.

20. See McKenna, supra note 3.

21. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 7.

22. Id.

23. McKenna, supra note 3.

24. McCarthy, supra note 2.

25. Zacchini, supra note 17.

26. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001).

27. Irvine v. Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch).

28. Id.

29. See generally contemporary scholarship on digital identity rights.

30. Id.

31. Puttaswamy, supra note 19.

32. Id.

33. Titan Indus., supra note 1.

34. McCarthy, supra note 2.

35. Comedy III, supra note 26.

36. Titan Indus., supra note 1.